This interview is based on Omran Shroufi’s paper, “A critical discourse analysis of Geert Wilders’ pro-Israelism.”
Shroufi, O. (2025). A critical discourse analysis of Geert Wilders’ pro-Israelism. Critical Discourse Studies, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2025.2574265
This interview was conducted by Claire Burchett.
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The paper describes Geert Wilders as a “quintessential, pro-Israel” politician and notes that pro-Israelism has become a widespread strategy among the far right to whitewash antisemitism and reinforce a civilisational discourse between the “West” and Islam. How far do you think Wilders has influenced far-right politicians and shaped their discourse in this respect? What are the risks of the increasing normalisation and spread of this discourse?
Wilders’ pro-Zionist discourse has clearly influenced several other far-right politicians and Wilders’ name is now widely associated with far-right support for Israel, including in Israel itself. For a previous paper, I examined a trip made by a group of far-right politicians to Israel and the occupied West Bank in 2010. Wilders’ name repeatedly came up in a series of interviews conducted by the German far-right blog Politically Incorrect, which is strongly supportive of the AfD and openly hostile to Muslims and migration. Filip Dewinter of the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Belang is perhaps the most notable example here, another far-right politician who has repeatedly expressed his vehement support for Israel, positioning himself as a sort of Flemish Geert Wilders.
Much like the way Jens Rydgren has argued the French Front National (now Rassemblement National) offered something akin to a new formula for other far-right parties to copy from the 1980s onwards – one that articulated racism through the lens of culture rather that biology – Wilders, I would argue, has offered a blueprint for how other far-right actors can connect their virulent Islamophobia with support for Israel – and in turn ‘cleanse’ their public image through a seemingly disavowal of anti-Semitism.
Nonetheless, it is important to note, and this is something that came out when writing the article, Wilders did not invent the Islamophobic pro-Israel discourse that he propagates. Prevailing narratives across the West have long placed Israel at the centre of a purported battle between the West and Islam. Already in the 1970s, Edward Said noted the prevalence of a “simple-minded dichotomy of freedom-loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs” within Western understandings of the Middle East.
The risks associated with the normalisation of such a discourse have sadly been in plain view since October 7 and the destruction of Gaza. A considerable number of influential and powerful commentors, politicians, and academics still accept that Israel’s actions are, on some level, justifiable. This has only been possible through the dehumanisation of Palestinians and the idea that Israel inherently embodies and acts in accordance with ‘our’ Western values.
Your analysis uses Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) for Wilders’ speech. Were there any specific discursive features that were most important in communicating Wilders’ narrative? Are there other contemporary social problems you feel CDA could be helpful in analysing?
What stood out in Wilders’ discourse was the repeated use of analogy and metonymy, where supposed parallels were continually drawn between the fate of Israel and the West, as well as between Palestinians and Islam, to the extent that the question of Israel/Palestine was essentially re-signified as a battle between the West and Islam. Similarly, a stark and almost cartoonish dichotomy of characteristics were attached to Israel and Palestine, light versus dark, enlightenment versus barbarism, democracy versus totalitarianism etc.
A key advantage of CDA here was that it pushed me to examine how this particular text exists within a web of other texts and practices. Indeed, CDA encourages researchers to look beyond a single event to trace the origins of its arguments and idea; to become aware of how ideas migrate and flow between different texts. More broadly, I would argue that analysing discourse, whether through CDA or another form of discourse analysis, is key to developing a more holistic understanding of the manifestations of far-right politics we see today, and to better grasping how the ideas being pushed by contemporary far-right parties have long been normalised by mainstream actors.
Wilders positions himself as being outside of the mainstream, and yet, as the paper indicates, he draws on “mainstream” Islamophobic and pro-Israel voices. Can you explain this paradox? Which are the most influential of these mainstream narratives?
This is indeed an interesting paradox and highlights how far-right actors such as Wilders claim to be outsiders, defending the voiceless, whilst they in fact reinforce an increasingly normalised and widespread form of prejudice. Compounding the racism that Muslim communities face daily is simply about entrenching disadvantage. Likewise regarding Israel, it is noteworthy that Wilders looks to portray the country as a downtrodden, defenceless victim, resembling the state equivalent of ‘the simple man on the street’, whereas this is evidently overblown, not only regarding its subjugation of the Palestinians, but also its willingness to carry out attacks in Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Yemen, and Iran without any real fear of reprisal. Yet portraying Israel as a victim helps to justify its actions in Palestine and elsewhere. Essentially, it is about trying to swap the role of perpetrator and victim, and lend credence to the idea that both Europe and Israel face similar existential threats.
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis is certainly visible within Wilders’ discourse, as well as its various modern iterations, fashioned by the likes of anti-immigration commentator Douglas Murray, and constantly pushed by publicists and commentators throughout Europe. This links up to the previous point about how Wilders’ discourse rest on a set of arguments that pre-existed his political career and that have been normalised by actors we don’t normally designate as far right.
The far right uses historical analogies, in that it distances itself from Nazism and yet returns to this historical reference to compare Islam(ism) to Nazism. How does the far right project this messaging into the future, and has this ideological trend been affected by Israel’s war and the ensuing destruction in Gaza?
The inconsistent use of historical references is indeed very interesting. We see something similar in the way history and tradition supposedly shape national belonging and determine who can really belong to society – yet far-right actors also refute any responsibility or guilt for what previous generations did, whether it be the crimes of the Holocaust or colonialism. In this case, I think this goes beyond ambiguous historical references and is more about redefining what anti-Semitism means today. The aim is to solidify a discourse that designates anti-Semitism as a uniquely Muslim problem that has been imported, as Esra Özyürek has shown. And we repeatedly see how pervasive this discourse is, think only about how mainstream politicians in Germany were happy to retweet a post that claimed that Hamas are essentially more evil than the Nazis. Israel’s war in Gaza has indeed accelerated this dynamic, with false comparisons consistently made between the bombing of Dresden and the destruction of Gaza. The more Palestinians are seen as modern-day Nazis, the easier it becomes to justify their killing. As unbelievable as it sounds, the Conservative Politician Michael Gove wrote an op-ed in January 2025 calling for the Israeli army to be awarded the Nobel peace prize. Who needs the far right in power when this is the discourse of established, mainstream politicians?
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Omran Shroufi is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), as well as a member of the VUB Centre for Democratic Futures (DFUTURE). Omran completed his PhD in Politics at the University of York, where he examined the emergence of pro-Israeli far-right parties in West Europe. His research focuses on far-right politics, discourses about the far right as well as the intersections between far-right and mainstream politics.
Claire Burchett (she/her) received her PhD from the department of European & International Studies at King’s College London. Her doctoral research analyses the social media output of the Alternative for Germany, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the National Rally in France, to consider how (anti-)antisemitism and victimhood narratives are used as political tools in the strategic inclusion and exclusion of Jews from the body politic, and to further anti-elitism and Islamophobia.
Omran and Claire are members of the RPRN.
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