This interview with George Newth is based on his recent article co-authored with Katy Brown and Aurelien Mondon:
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In this article you develop a definition of the far right as a political position, rather than a tool to categorise political parties. Could you explain this definition and how it is potentially more generative than current understandings of far-right politics?
One of our key contentions is that the term ‘far right’ should not be viewed merely as a framework for classifying political parties. We maintain that far-right politics is not exclusive to a single group but can be employed by a range of actors. We also contend that it is racism which is fundamental to far-right ideology, though it is frequently disguised through subtle, coded language about culture and identity. Taking our cue from scholars such as Maria-Elena Indelicato and Maíra Magalhães Lopes we emphasise that race and racism are the ‘glue’ that holds together other intersecting reactionary discourses, including – but not limited to – homophobia, transphobia, anti-genderism, ableism, classism, and sexism. We argue, therefore, that being nominally a mainstream actor does not mean that one cannot support or implement far-right politics, espouse and promote far-right discourse or legitimise and embolden far- and extreme-right actors. Far-right politics can, therefore, be used by a variety of different actors, rather than it being solely used to categorise and classify parties.
Such a definition is more generative as it helps identify and call out far-right politics wherever it emerges, not just focusing on the ‘usual suspects’. We use the UK as a case study to show how much of what is described as far right is neither new nor exceptional in the British context. A closer look through our conceptual lens reveals how far-right moral panics surrounding trans and gender identity, freedom of speech, and anti-immigration rhetoric like ‘stop the boats’ have been embraced by both the Conservative and Labour parties in the UK. Most recently, Keir Starmer’s borrowing from Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech to suggest the UK is becoming an ‘island of strangers’ due to immigration, clearly illustrates our conceptualisation of far-right politics, which emboldens far-right and reactionary parties, individuals, and organisations.
Worryingly, similar patterns can be observed in various other contexts. We believe, therefore, that our concept holds the potential to generate deeper debate, dialogue, and scholarly inquiry into these matters.
Far-right studies often deploys a ‘waves’ metaphor to historicise the post-World War 2 far right. In this paper, you suggest we are in a new era of far-right politics: a ‘fifth wave’. How does this ‘fifth wave’ differ from previous iterations of the far right?
Taking our cue from Lola Olufemi, and Alex Charnley and Michael Richmond in their respective critiques of ‘waves of feminism’, we argue that we must consider continuities between different waves rather than view them in isolation, and also problematise implied binaries between the mainstream and far right.
We believe that it is useful to talk about a fifth wave where the identities of the mainstream and the far right have become mutually constitutive and that far-right politics is often effectively mainstream.
In other words, since 2016, far-right ideas have become increasingly normalized and integrated into mainstream political narratives. For instance, a key characteristic of this ‘fifth wave’, which we illustrate in our case study of the UK, is the increased depiction of immigration as a threat to the nation-state in elite discourse. This illustrates increasingly blurred lines between the mainstream and far right, including the mainstream’s adoption of the far-right framing of immigration as a ‘legitimate concern’. Further illustrative of this is the election of Donald Trump in the US, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, the rise of the Hindutva movement in India and Marine Le Pen’s performance in France, as well as the genocidal war waged by Israel in Gaza.
Importantly, however, while our concept of a ‘fifth wave’ emphasises that the mainstreaming of far right and reactionary politics has gathered momentum since 2016, we also stress that this is not new and that history is littered with examples of intersections between the mainstream and far right. Furthermore, such politics of exclusion have often originated and been maintained by the mainstream from their inception. Our ‘fifth wave’ interpretation, therefore, highlights that the far right should not be viewed as innately distinct from the mainstream and avoids an idealised past where the mainstream was essentially ‘good’.
How can this conceptual intervention help us understand the ways in which we can more effectively resist reactionary politics?
History teaches us that restricting resistance to reactionary politics to the electoral arena is a fundamentally flawed strategy, encouraging a circumscribed view of democracy which can be weaponised by the far right. Meanwhile, the accommodation and mainstreaming of far-right politics which appears to be the current approach of many mainstream parties, only serves to embolden reactionaries while encouraging mass disengagement and disaffection amongst the popular classes? .
By shifting the focus away from categorisation towards an understanding of far-right politics as a political position, we point to the need of a continued interrogation of the interplay between the mainstream and the far right.
Crucially, as part of this resistance to reactionary politics we also encourage a definitive move away from labelling the far right as ‘populist’. Indeed, the mass mobilisations against the racist riots in the UK in the summer of 2024 and the continued demonstrations against the ongoing genocide in Gaza both raise important questions of who are ‘the people’ in mainstream discourse. The antagonism central to far-right politics cannot simply be explained by a populist discourse of ‘the people versus the elites’ but instead in a the broader ‘us v them’ antagonism which operates instead from a logic of exclusion.
The more we can call out and stigmatise reactionary politics as an elitist, racist, and exclusionary politics of division rather than that which purportedly responds to a mythologised ‘left behind’ or ‘white working class’, the better able we are to build the alliances and solidarity which is essential to resist the politics of hate and fear.
The interview was conducted by Alex Yates.
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George Newth is a member of the RPRN. His research focuses principally on the how far-right parties attempt to normalise their reactionary politics via discourses of common sense. This links to broader research interests pertaining to the role of populism and nativism in far right articulations of regionalist and nationalist politics.
His book with Routledge, Fathers of the Lega: Populist Regionalism and Populist Nationalism in Historical Perspective, investigates the historical roots of the Italian Republic’s oldest surviving political party, the populist far-right Lega (Nord), tracing its origins to post-war Italy.
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