This interview is based on Odilon Caldeira Neto’s book Neo-Fascism and the Far Right in Brazil published Cambridge University Press (2025).
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In your book, you use the term neofascism, could tell us about this choice and why it applies to the current situation in Brazil?
I believe that the category of neofascism is valid for the purpose of my book, as well as for research that is interested in the movement of these groups in scenarios of democratic crises and the rise of the far right. There are two main reasons for using this category: one concerns the forms in which we can read the political processes of the history of fascisms, and the other gives us a basis for understanding the processes of radicalisation of the right- wing today.
In the field of fascism studies, there are two interpretations that I believe are fundamental. The first is the tradition that understands fascism as a global phenomenon, with Latin America (and particularly Brazil) being an important locus for the construction of fascist experiences, which definitely influenced the political culture of the local and regional far right. And since fascism is a fundamental part of this history, it doesn’t end in 1945. That’s why, secondly, studies on neofascism seem so interesting and timely to me, because they start from an effort to understand the ways in which intellectual tendencies and minor groups will try to articulate themselves for the resurgence or commemoration of those foundations that mobilised the masses in the first half of the 20th century. There are certainly many changes in the scenario of neofascism when compared to the picture of fascism as a global expression of the 20th century, which is why this category is necessary. The history of neofascism has important particularities. And when we look at this history – and taking the Brazilian context as an object of analysis – my argument is that, unlike the epoch of ‘historical fascism’, neofascism has a late development in Brazil, and the reasons for this are varied, as I try to argue in my text. Despite this ‘late phenomenon’, it has developed rapidly in recent decades, providing a plural picture, varying from its degree of institutionalisation to the intensity of the radicalisation of these groups.
On the other hand, as a researcher, I’m interested in understanding the spaces and articulations of neofascism as part of an even larger field, made up of other political traditions, as it were. In other words, neofascism is not an absolutely foreign part of the radical right, but an active component in its radicalisation processes. In this respect, the Brazilian case is interesting for a number of reasons, including the fact that Bolsonarism has not built a unique political project, nor has it endeavoured to make a viable political party. In addition to an apparent ‘parasitism’ on already consolidated political groups and parties, this ‘fluidity’ has meant that the Bolsonaro camp has needed to build an agenda of radicalisation and constant mobilisation of some social bases, as well as broad trends on the Brazilian far right. This is where neofascism comes in. Not that neofascist groups have become Bolsonarists, just as Bolsonarism has not been reduced to neofascism. But there has been some kind of dialogue and intersection. I believe that this is a characteristic of the particularities of Bolsonarism (and its strategies or political needs for mobilisation), which are obviously not exclusive to the Brazilian reality, but are also the result of the characteristics and stages of development of neofascism in Brazil.
In other words, the purpose is to understand neofascism in Brazil in terms of a global history, as well as to understand the development of this trend in the context of the rise of the far right.
With your use, you stress that we should not simply take it to mean a simple return to the 1930s but something diverse and evolving. Could you explain why this is so important?
It’s definitely not a return to the past or a watertight model brought about by the experiences of the 1930s, which is also why I speak in terms of ‘neofascism’ and not ‘fascism’. Although integralism is an important reference for the neofascist camp and even for the scenario of the far right, the picture I’m analysing is more complex. For this reason, I propose dividing neofascism in Brazil into three waves. The first is made up of neointegralism, Holocaust denial and variations on the neo-Nazi scenario. The second wave is a moment of effective transnational interlocution of neofascism and integration into a more plural ideological framework. As a radicalisation of this framework, the third wave is made up of a greater diversity of groups and strategies, which vary from the paths of metapolitics, to some nods to formal politics, as well as radicalisation that gives rise to the use of terrorist tactics. In other words, it’s an evolutionary and more complex picture.
From outside of Brazil, it could seem that Bolsonarism and neofascism are receding, particularly since Bolsonaro and his acolytes have been charged early this year. Are there reasons for optimism or is this the calm before the storm?
It’s hard to say, but I wouldn’t be so optimistic. From Bolsonarism’s point of view, there seem to be three major ways out. The first would be to bet on a ‘pacification’ agenda, proposing the Amnesty thesis to parliamentarians and the executive branch. The second would be the possibility of transnational radicalisation, proposing some kind of political pressure via strategic international partners (preferably via Donald Trump). The third, more diffuse way, is the movement of constant radicalisation, which can be based both on the articulation of the leaders of the Bolsonarist camp, as well as through individual actions. Each of these strategies, if successful, brings challenges for Brazilian democracy, some more immediate, others not so much. In relation to the Brazilian neofascist field, this is a scenario that escapes the dynamics of institutional politics and the direction of Bolsonarism, although it can be influenced by it. If we consider the rise of these groups, their broader repertoires, as well as the rates of violent attacks, I would say that we are in the midst of a sea of turmoil. Some of them are still little explored.
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Odilon Caldeira Neto is a Brazilian historian and a member of the RPRN. Associate Professor of Contemporary History and in the Graduate Program in History at the Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF, Brazil). He is a researcher dedicated to the themes of political extremism, neo-fascism, political violence, and the transnationalism of the radical-right. On these topics, he is the author of dozens of articles and book chapters, as well books, published in Brazil, Argentina, Spain, Russia, Portugal and the United Kingdom. He is Coordinator of the Research Group Observatory of the Extreme Right. Caldeira Neto is an Associate Researcher of the Working Group “Derechas contemporáneas: dictaduras y democracias” (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, CLACSO), member of the Network “Lusophone Connections: dictatorships and democracies in Portuguese”. Member of the Executive Committee of the Network “Right-Wing, History and Memory”, of the scientific committee of the Observatory of Negationism” and of the Standing Group on “Extremism and Democracy & Political Violence” (European Consortium for Political Research).
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